Efficiency and stability are two important concepts in coalition formation analysis. One common assumption in many well-known criteria such as the core and Pareto-efficiency is that there exists a publicly known value for each coalition or sub-coalition. However, in software agent applications, this assumption is often not true as the agents rarely know the exact coalition values for certain. Instead, agents have to rely on whatever evidence they can observe, and evaluate those evidence according to their private information base on past experience. There are two sources of uncertainty here. First, such private information is often uncertain in nature or may even be self-conflicting. Second, the agents, which are heterogeneous and autonomous, may have different conflict resolution strategies. Such uncertainties make the traditional approaches unfit for many real-world problems, except perhaps, in idealized scenarios. In this paper, we extend the core and Pareto optimality criteria by proposing a new rule based stability concepts under uncertain environment: the CU-Core.
INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is one important feature of multi-agents systems. For example, agents in a semi-competitive environment often need to form coalitions in order to achieve tasks that cannot be done alone, or to maximize their own payoff via mutually benefiting agreements. Many coalition formation mechanisms have been proposed in the past (Blankenburg and Klusch, 2004; Sandholm, 1999; Ketchpel, 1994) . In order to analyze the stability and efficiency of such coalitional games, many models have been developed, especially in cooperative game theory (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994; Scarf, 1967) .
In a coalitional game, each coalition is associated with a set of feasible allocations or consequences, which are the outcome of the game as a result of the agents' joint action. One classic solution concept in cooperative game theory is the core (Gillies, 1959; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) , which defines that a certain allocation for a coalition is stable (i.e, in the core) if no individual members or groups of members can deviate from the original coalition and obtain a more preferable outcome for each of the deviating members. The core either requires the specification of publicly known values of each possible allocation for all coalition and sub-coalitions, or, in nontransferable utility games, the agents' preferences regarding each possible consequences obtainable by the coalition. In both cases, the values or the preferences are supposed to be known for certain.
In many software agent problems, we are not able to attach such an exact value or preferences for every coalitional game that we analyze, as there are often uncertainties regarding the achievable outcomes of a coalition: two agents cooperating to solve a certain task may not know for certain whether their plan will be successful or not; an agent's preference may depend on the future value of some unknown environment parameters. However, such uncertainty does not defer coalitions to be formed in the real world. Instead of evaluating a proposed coalition by predefined preferences or publicly known values as done in traditional approaches, agents tend to rely on various available information from their previous experience to predict the future outcome, based on whatever information they can currently observe.
As an example, consider a buyer coalition problem (Yamamoto and Sycara, 2001; He and Ioerger, 2004) where several agents are negotiating to form coalitions to buy items of good quality from some online sellers (for example, they may form groups in order to obtain volume discounts). Typically, the only observable attributes regarding an item being sold on-line is the item's product name, brand-name, item's location and the seller's name, whereas the quality of the item is not observable (or not verifiable) at the time of purchase. One thing that the agents can do in this uncertain situation is to match those attribute values against the quality of other items in their previous purchase experience. For example, the buyer may want to consider the quality of previously bought items from the same brand and the same seller. This way, each agent can have an estimation of the quality of the current item, which in turn influences the agent's decision of whether to join the buyer coalition or not. Thus, to each agent, the problem now becomes a series of classification problems: given the observable item attributes, an agent must classify each possible coalition as either "preferred" or "not preferred" where "preferred" means that the agents believe there is no better options. From this point of view, such a coalition is stable if only if every member of the coalition "prefers" it.
Several extensions of the core have been proposed in order to model coalitional games with uncertainty, for instance, a stochastic payoff approach is proposed in (Suijs et al., 1999) and a Bayesian core proposed in (Chalkiadakis and Boutilier, 2004) . However, while these works provide good theoretical foundation on stochastic cooperative games, they are not suitable to handle problems such as the buyer coalition game described above, as the samples (i.e., the agent's purchase experience) are often too sparse to provide any meaningful estimation of the probability distributions, which these approaches rely on. So instead, we are taking a rule based approach. In this approach, each agent is assumed to hava some private knowledge which can be used to generate rules. However, private knowledge are not always without uncertainty (for example, two similar items in the buying history may have different quality), resulting in rules that may conflict with each other. Thus the stability of a coalition game depends not only on the observable attributes and the decision rules of each agent, but also on how such conflicts are resolved by each agent.
Because of this, we argue that it is not sufficient to describe such coalitions as simply "stable" (i.e, in the core) or not, as done in the core-based approaches. Instead, we propose a new stability criteria, the CU-core. The CU-core divides the obtainable consequences of a coalition into three stability classes: those that are certainly stable (c-core), those that may be stable (u-core), depending on the agents' conflict resolution strategies, and those that are certainly not stable. We believe the proposed concepts can provide useful solution concepts for this emerging type of coalition games, which we call non- The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the main ideas by discussing a coalition formation problem that is not well handled by the traditional core-based approaches. Section 3 discusses some related background concepts. Section 4 defines a type of game which we labeled non-transferable utility game with uncertainty. A rule based agent decision model is defined in section 5. Section 6 defines the new stability concepts of CU-core. Some potential applications of the proposed concepts are discussed in section 7. Section 8 lists some related works. After that, we conclude.
AN MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
In this section we study an example that cannot be handled by the core-based approaches. Example 1. Four agents A 1 to A 4 are planning to do one of two possible activities: they either go to play tennis or they go to watch a science fiction (S.F.) movie produced by a director named Steven Spielberg. Suppose the preference of each agent depends on one factor only, the quality of the movie, which can either be good, average or bad. Their exact preferences are described in table 1. If the movie is good, then all four agents prefer the movie over tennis. On the contrary, if the movie is bad, then all four agents prefer tennis over movie. However, if the quality is average, then A 1 and A 2 prefer the movie, but A 3 and A 4 prefer to play tennis instead. Also, assuming all else being equal, the agents prefer to attend an activity in a group (i.e., coalition) that is as large as possible. For example, a tennis coalition of four agents is preferred over two tennis coalitions of two tennis players each. We also assume that all agents in the same coalition perform the same activity, and that should any agents decide to play tennis, they must go in groups of even number of players.
There are difficulties in analyzing this game using the traditional core based approaches. First, it is not possible to assign a transferable coalition value to each possible allocation or consequence of each subcoalition: while the agents know their preferences in But the main problem here is that even those preferences are uncertain and depend on the quality of the movie, which is unknown at the time of negotiation. Now, suppose that the agents keep records of the movies they have seen before as shown in table 2 to table 5. Each table records the director, movie type and quality of the movies of an agent's viewing history and the agent uses it to predict the quality of current movie. For example, agent A 1 will have the opinion that the current movie (an S.F. movie directed by Spielberg) will probably be good since the qualities of all similar cases in his experience (table 2) are good.
However, even with such extra information, it is still hard to apply the traditional core-based game analysis to this game because the outcome will still depend on how the experiences are interpreted by the individual agents.
Let us first consider a two agents movie coalition {A 1 , A 2 }. This case is straightforward enough: both agents will have the opinion that the movie should be good, since the qualities of all previous Spielberg's S.F. movies in their experience have been good, and, according to their preference in table 1, movie is preferred over tennis in this case. So if both agents make their decision purely based on their experience, the coalition would certainly be stable. Similarly, any tennis coalition involving either A 1 or A 2 will certainly fall apart as both agents have a better option.
However, a {A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 } movie coalition is more problematic as there are conflicting entries in the viewing history of A 3 and A 4 . In this case, both A 3 and A 4 can only conclude from their experience that the quality of the current movie may either be "good" or "average", yet according to their preference, both agents will stay in the coalition only if the quality is good. Therefore the stability of this coalition depends on how the conflicts are resolved by the two agents.
Thus we see that the traditional core-based coalition stability concepts, which classify all solutions as either being in the core or not, are insufficient to describe games such as this one. Instead, we need a new model that can classify coalitions into different levels of stability. On one extreme, we have the certainly stable coalitions such as the {A 1 , A 2 } movie coalition. On the other extreme, we have the certainly not stable coalition of {A 1 , A 2 } tennis coalition, and somewhere in between, we have the conditionally stable movie coalition of {A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 }.
The game discussed in Example 1 is a type of game called non-transferable utility games with uncertainty (NTUU games). Yet, to our knowledge, there are currently few coalition formation algorithms proposed for such type of games. One reason for that could be the current lack of useful solution concepts. As mentioned above, the probabilistic based solution concepts are unsuitable for this type of games for two reasons. First, these existing works focus mainly on games with transferable utilities. Second, there are cases where a probabilistic model is not suitable, such as multi-agent cooperation games where the samples (agent's experience) are too sparse to provide any meaningful estimation of the probability distributions (as seen in Example 1), or in applications where the agents employ rule-based reasoning and where knowledge is kept in form of decision rules or in decision tables, which is the case in many A.I. systems. For these reasons, we are proposing a new solution concepts that is suitable for NTUU games in general, and we believe the model can fill a gap in the current approaches.
BACKGROUND: NTU GAMES
A coalition game with non-transferable utility (NTU games) can be described as follows. A set of agents N = {1, . . . , n} is called a coalition, and each subset S ⊆ N is called a sub-coalition. Each coalition and sub-coalition is associated with a set of feasible consequences, which are the possible outcomes that can be achieved as a result of some joint-action of the members of that coalition (or sub-coalition). For example, the consequence of a buyer coalition game may be the number of goods received by each member of the sub-coalition and the amount they pay, whereas the set of feasible consequences are those that conform to the selling price of the items. Each agent has a preference relation on the set of feasible consequences such that for any two feasible consequence x 1 and x 2 , we have x 1 i x 2 iff x 1 is no less preferred than x 2 to that agent i.
More formally, we can define an NTU game by a tuple g =< N, X,V, ( i ) >, where, N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents (a coalition). X is the set of consequences. V : 2 N → 2 X is a function that map each sub-coalition S ⊆ N to a set of feasible consequence V (S) ⊆ X. i is the i-th agent's preference relation.
The core of an NTU game is then defined as the set of consequences such that no sub-coalition S ⊆ N can defect by finding an alternative consequence where each member of the sub-coalition S would prefer the alternative consequence. That is, a consequence x ∈ V (N) is in the core if there does not exist a sub-coalition S ⊆ N and an alternative consequence y ∈ V (N) such that y i x∀ i ∈ S.
NTU GAMES WITH UNCERTAINTY
Traditional game theory concepts such as NTU games and the core are insufficient in modeling the game in Example 1. The reason is that we are actually facing a new type of game where the outcome is uncertain. We call this new type of game Non-transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty (NTUU games). We propose a model for this type of games as illustrated in figure 1. An NTUU game is defined by a tuple g =< N, E, (I i ), H, X, (P i ) > as follows. N = {1, . . . n} is the set of agents, which is called a coalition. X is a set of feasible consequences, i.e., out- comes that can be achieved as a result of some jointaction of the members of that coalition. 
where each a i corresponds to the name of an environmental variable and v i its value, d r ∈ V H corresponds to a value of the state. Each rule represents one instance of an agent's previous experience in dealing with problems similar to the current one. P i is the i-th agent's set of preference rules. Each preference rule has the form:
where d i ∈ V H denotes a possible value of the state, and x and x ′ are feasible consequences.
As an example, consider the game in Example 1, where four agents are discussing to form coalitions to either see a Spielberg's S.F movie or to play tennis. It can be modeled as follows: in this example, we have N = {A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 } being the set of agents. Some of the feasible consequence X for this coalition are (tennis, tennis, tennis, tennis), (tennis, tennis, movie, movie), (movie, movie, movie, movie). . . etc. The evidence E in this case is {(director=Spielberg) ∧ (type=S.F.)}, and the state H is the quality of the movie, whose possible values V H are {good, average, bad}, but its value for the current game is to be determined.
In order to estimate the value of the hidden state, each agent is equipped some experience which is a collection of experience rules I i . Here the left hand side (L.H.S.) of the rule corresponds to a previously observed evidence, and the right hand side (R.H.S.) corresponds to the value of the state that occurred. For instance, the experience of agent A 3 (table 4) can be represented by the following experience rules:
Note that rule ER1 and rule ER2 are in conflict with each other. Also, any duplicating rules are removed for simplicity.
We model the i-th agent's preference by a set of preference rules P i .
As an example, suppose we are given the two consequences x 1 = (tennis, tennis, tennis, tennis) and x 2 = (movie, movie, movie, movie), we have the following preference rules for A 3 :
In particular, the last rule reads: "In the cases that I (agent A 3 ) have reason to believe the quality is either average or bad but I am not sure which is the case, I would say that x 1 is better than x 2 ."
OPINION AND AGENT PREFERENCES
Before we present the CU-core, we need to discuss two concepts: agent's opinion and agent's preference. Given the evidence regarding the current game, and a set of experience rules representing an agent's past experience, an agent derives its opinion as follows. The agent first matches the evidence against the L.H.S. of the experience rules such that any matching rules are "fired", and the corresponding values of the state, as suggested by the R.H.S. of the rules, become members of the opinions of the agents. Thus, continuing from the previous example, where we have evidence E = {(director = Spielberg) ∧ (type = S.F)} and the experience of agent A 3 are represented by the rules ER1 to ER4, we see that rule ER1 and rule ER2 are fired, and the corresponding opinion of the agent A 3 is therefore B 3 ={average, good}. Note that this does not intend to mean A 3 believes the probability of any other state value other than "average" or "good" must be zero. In most applications including our examples, the obtained samples (i.e, the agents' experience) are far too sparse to provide any meaningful assessment to the probabilistic distribution of the state values. Rather, the opinion B 3 ={average, good} should be understood as "From my (i.e, agent A 3 's) limited (self-conflicting) experience so far, I have reason to believe the state is either average or good".
As mentioned in previous section, the preferences of each agent are captured by a set of preference rules. Continue from above discussion where we have x 1 = (tennis, tennis, tennis, tennis) and x 2 = (movie, movie, movie, movie), and the preference rules of A 3 are the four rules P1 to P4. In order to decide which preference rules are fired, we first check if any of the L.H.S. of the preference rules matches the opinion. After that, if no matching is found, we look for partial matching that matches a subset of the opinion. For example, given the opinion of A 3 which is {average, good}, since no matching is found, we look for partial matchings, which are P1 and P2 in this case and both rules are fired. In this case, the preference of the agent is said to be in conflict as the R.H.S. of the two fired rules do not contain the same value. For comparison, suppose instead that the opinion is {average, bad}, then in this case, rule P4 is fired, but not P1 and P3, as the more general rule P4 overrides them. The reason for this is to allow the agent a chance to explicitly specify more general preference rules to handle any possible conflict that he may foresee. More precisely, we have the following definition:
Definition 5.1 (Agent's preferences given opinion). Given any two consequences x i and x j and opinion B i of agent i, we define
Again, it should be noted that it is possible to have both x i ≻ B i x j and x j ≻ B i x i . In such cases, the agent's preferences are in conflict, and one uncertainty in determining the stability of a coalition is how such conflicts are resolved by the agents.
CU-CORE
We can now define the coalition stability criteria. The result is denoted by a new concepts, namely the CUcore. The CU-core of a coalition is defined by two sets, namely the set of conditionally stable solutions (c-core) and the set of unconditionally stable solutions (u-core). The main idea is as follows: we say a consequence x is definitely objected by a sub-coalition if there is another consequence y such that every member in the sub-coalition would certainly prefer x over y. We say a consequence x is potentially objected by a sub-coalition if there is an alternate consequence y such that every member in the sub-coalition may prefer x over y, as suggested by their preference rules and opinions. We say a consequence is in the u-core if it has no definite or potential objection, and we say a consequence is in the c-core if it has no definite objection.
Definition 6.1.1 (Conditionally Stable Solutions).
The c-core of a coalition is the set of feasible consequence X ccore , such that for each x ∈ X ccore , there does not exist another feasible consequence x ′ ∈ X and a sub-coalition C ′ ⊆ N, such that we have x ′ ≻ B i x holds but not x ≻ B i x ′ for each member i ∈ C ′ .
Definition 6.1.2 (Unconditionally Stable Solutions).
The u-core of a coalition is the set of feasible consequence X ucore , such that for each x ∈ X ucore , there does not exist another feasible consequence x ′ ∈ X and a sub-coalition C ′ ⊆ N, such that we have x ′ ≻ B i x for each member i ∈ C ′ .
In Example 1, for the n 1 = {A 1 , A 2 } coalition, the consequence x 1 = (movie, movie) is in both u-core and c-core, whereas the x 2 = (tennis, tennis) consequence is in neither core. For the n 2 = {A1, A2, A3, A4} coalition, the consequence x 3 = (movie, movie, movie, movie) consequence is in c-core only, whereas x 4 = (tennis, tennis, tennis, tennis) is in neither core. Thus we see that the (n 1 , x 1 ) solution is the most stable among the four, and is therefore a good candidate solution that should be considered by coalition formation mechanisms, while (n 1 , x 2 ) and (n 2 , x 3 ) are the least stable and should be rejected.
In general, we have the follow result:
Theorem 1. For a given coalition, any consequence that is in the u-core is also in the c-core.
Proof. This follows directly from the definitions 6.1.1 and 6.1.2
APPLICATION AREAS
In this section, we summarize several application areas where we believe the proposed CU-core can provide a useful solution concept.
Applications in non-transferable utility game
While the existing probabilistic approaches define stability concepts on an important class of uncertain coalition game with transferable utility, there are many applications where it is more natural to describe the game in terms of agents' preference instead of transferable utilities. For example, in Example 1, it would be sufficient for an agent to simply state "I prefer movie over tennis if the movie is good." instead of stating "My utility for the movie is 0.5, whereas my utility for tennis is 0.2, given that the quality is good." And even if the utilities are stated in the latter way, they are likely not transferable utilities. The problem here is, of course, the probabilistic approaches cannot be easily applied to this more general class of non-transferable utility games.
Agents with case-based decision model
As mentioned above, not all decision systems are probabilistic in nature. For instance, case base reasoning (CBR) is an important decision making approach in many artificial intelligent systems (Plaza and Mcginty, 2005) . In a typical CBR system, a case base with known outcome is maintained. To solve a new problem, the attributes of the new problem is compared against the known cases in the case base. A best match is found and the outcome of that best match is then used as the proposed solution for the new problem. CBR is typically used where the problem space is large so that there are not sufficient samples to provide a reasonable probabilistic model for the whole problem space, as required by the probabilistic approaches. The stability concept we proposed is much more suitable for multi-agent applications employing such decision models.
RELATED WORKS
We discuss some related works in this section. A Bayesian-core concept is proposed in (Chalkiadakis and Boutilier, 2004) where the agents are assumed to belong to various types which are unknown to other agents. The agents are required to estimate the value of potential coalitions by maintaining a Bayesian be-lief system regarding the possible types of their potential partners and update their beliefs in a reinforcement learning based approach in repeated games scenario. As mentioned above, our work differs from theirs in that we do not pre-assume any probabilistic models in particular, and that our model assumes the more general problem of non-transferable utilities games, instead of transferable one. A solution concept for coalition game with stochastic payoff is presented in (Suijs et al., 1999) . In this approach, the payoffs (i.e., the consequences) are assumed to be stochastic variables, and agents preferences over those stochastic variables are used to determine the stability of a coalition. Thus, their work is on stochastic games, whereas our focus is on a more general class of non-transferable utility game that are not necessarily probabilistic in nature.
A mechanism for forming coalition under uncertainty is proposed in (Kraus et al., 2003; Kraus et al., 2004) . In these two works, a multi-rounds mechanism is proposed where, in each round, the agents are arranged in a certain order and they make coalition formation proposals or accept proposals in that order. The mechanism repeats until each agent belongs to a coalition. Again, the difference is that their approach is based on the assumption of transferable utility and the kernel is used as the stability concept, which is not our assumption.
CONCLUSION
Classical coalition formation concepts in game theory are deterministic in nature. That is, they assume the value of each coalition to be publicly known for certain. However this assumption is not practical in many software agent applications where intelligent agents have to rely on whatever evidences they can perceive or their past experience to estimate such coalition values. The probabilistic approaches provide a good alternative in many cases, but are not suitable in some multi-agent applications where the samples are sparse and where the agents utility are nontransferable. In this paper, we propose a new type of game which we label non-transferable utility games with uncertainty, and provide a new concept for describing the stability of coalitions under uncertainties, namely, the CU-core. By doing so, we are able to provide useful stability concepts for this new type of game which otherwise cannot be handled using the classic deterministic approaches or the probabilistic approaches. We believe our model provide a useful tool in evaluating coalition formation algorithms for cooperative games under uncertainty.
